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International Court of Justice

H3668 - 0002

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

EVIDENCE DIVISION

Date : 4 August 1948

I certify that Document Number R-656 R-657 was introduced into evidence as Exhibit Number GB 178 179 in the Trial by the International Military Tribunal of Hermann GOERING, et al, which commenced on 20 November 1945, and that the attached photostat is a true and correct copy of the original.

Fred Niebergall

Fred NIEBERGALL
Chief, Document
Control Branch.

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C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that the annexed document D-656 D-654
No. GB- 148 149 is a photostat of an original document submitted in evidence by the British Prosecution under this number. The original document has been withdrawn in accordance with Rule 10 of the International Military Tribunal, and to the best of my knowledge and belief is to be held at the OCCWC Evidence Library, Palace of Justice, Nuremberg

Paul Joosten

PAUL A. JOOSTEN

General Secretary
International Military Tribunal

Nuremberg, 4 August 1948

[CONFIDENTIAL]

79th Congress
1st Session

JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT

PEARL HARBOR

INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY 1 AND DECEMBER 8, 1941

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
NURNBERG, GERMANY
GB Exhibit 148
Filed Jan 9, 1946

GB-148 = Pages 200-202
GB-149 = Page 253

Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
78807 WASHINGTON : 1945

B 038422
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[Secret]

From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
29 November 1941
#1393 (In 3 parts, complete)

By his request, I was supposed to have called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop during the evening of yesterday, the 28th. Suddenly, however, he requested that the time be postponed and it was not until 10:30 at night that I finally saw him.

This delay was occasioned by the fact that a long conference of the bigwigs of the government and military, from Goering down, was being held at the official residence of the Fuehrer. The war against the Soviet Union has now taken definite shape and the outcome can be unerringly foretold. Next year's campaigns were mapped at this conference, taking into consideration the points brought up at the conference of the various Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Europe. It is an absolute certainty that Japan's moves were also given discussion at this conference.

1. Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had received any reports regarding the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. I replied that I had received no official word.

Ribbentrop: "It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan.

"As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We have received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of the Japanese-U. S. negotiations being concluded successfully, because of the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front.

"If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan herself."

I: "I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that a state of actual war is to be established between Germany and the United States?"

Ribbentrop: "Roosevelt's a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell what he would do."

Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops*, and from the tone of Hitler's recent speech as well as that of Ribbentrop's, I feel that German attitude toward the United States is being considerably stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if necessary.

(Part 2)

2. I made inquiries as to the future of the war against the Soviet Union.

Ribbentrop: "The Fuehrer has stated that he is now determined to crush the Soviet Union to an even greater extent than he had planned at first. He is now bent on completely wiping out that state and went on to announce that practically all of the main military objectives had been attained and that a greater part of the German troops would shortly be brought back to Germany.

"Following up those campaigns, the Caucasus campaign will be launched in earnest. Next Spring Germany will advance to and cross the Ural Mountains and chase Stalin deep into Siberia."

I: "Approximately when do you expect that?"

Ribbentrop: "The campaign will be launched in about May of next year, according to present schedules."

I. "According to what you say, Germany is apparently preparing to gamble quite a bit in her Russian campaign. We hope that air connections between Germany and Manchukuo can be established at an early time."

Ribbentrop: "That is an item that Germany has been considering for some time. By summer of next year I do not believe that air connection from the Ural area to Manchukuo will be an impossibility."

3. I then asked him about the campaign against England proper to which he replied that before launching landing operations against England, Germany will probably completely wipe out Britain's influence in the Near East, Africa, Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Sea. I got the impression that more emphasis is being placed on this area than heretofore. So, I asked whether it was Germany's intention to conclude the war without attempting to go through with a campaign against England.

Ribbentrop: "Germany has, of course, made all necessary preparations for this campaign. However, Germany is in receipt of intelligences which would seem to indicate that all is not well within England herself. For example, we hear that there is a split within the ranks of the Conservatives; that Churchill's influence is on the wane; that Bevin, Chief of the Labor Party, is advocating revolutionary measures: All of these are tending to make the preservation of order there increasingly difficult.

"Of course, I am not one to implicitly believe all of this. However, I am convinced that things are getting bad in England. Under these circumstances, it may be that Germany's various other campaigns may cause England to fall even without our going through with our landing operations against England herself.

(Part 3)

"In any event, Germany has absolutely no intention of entering into any peace with England. We are determined to remove all British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this war, England will have no influence whatsoever, in international affairs. The Island Empire of Britain may remain, but all of her other possessions throughout the world will probably be divided three ways by Germany, the United States, and Japan. In Africa, Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were formerly German colonies. Italy will be given the greater share of the African colonies. Germany desires above all else, to control European Russia."

4. In conclusion, I said: "I am fully aware of the fact that Germany's war campaign is progressing according to schedule smoothly. How-

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ever, suppose that Germany is faced with the situation of having not only Great Britain as an actual enemy but also have all of those areas in which Britain has influence and those countries which have been aiding Britain as actual enemies as well. Under such circumstances, the war area will undergo considerable expansion, of course. What is your opinion of the outcome of the war under such an eventuality?"

Ribbentrop: "We would like to end this war during next year. However, under certain circumstances, it is possible that it will have to be continued on into the following year.

"Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on that point."

In closing this conference, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop requested that the contents of our talks be kept a strict secret. Please, therefore, exercise particular caution in handling this message.

I have shown copies of this message to the military and naval attache's, Lt-Gen. (Vice Adm.?) Nomura, and Maj-Gen (Rear Adm.?) Abe. Please show a copy to the Army and Navy authorities in Tokyo, too.

(In the last section of the first part of this message, we wrote * * * "the U. S. would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops" * * * That should have read: "the U. S. would undoubtedly try to avoid war".)

25556
JD-1: 6942 (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (7)

* See end of message.

[Secret]

From: Bangkok
To: Tokyo
29 November 1941
#872 (In 2 parts, complete)

Re my #855.*

As a result of my conversation with PIBUN**, I have been able to ascertain his attitude to a large degree, and therefore through Yoshioka who as the outside agency of the Naval Attache's office, we have suggested to SIN and WANITTO*** that, in the event of Thai's abandoning her neutrality policy in the future, it would be better both from the standpoint of face and also for material reasons for her to go through the formality herself of requesting cooperative action from the nation concerned, rather than to be put in the position of being compelled to consent to it because of pressure brought to bear. The shifts within the government mentioned in my caption message, are a result of the above. When SIN heard this from Yoshioka, he said that this is a matter he has been concerned over the past two years, and as he feels that he himself is the most suitable person to handle the matter he promised to put forth every effort for its realization. He is also said to have told WANITTO that the matter should be left to him. WANITTO and SIN are keeping in touch with us through Yoshioka in regard to subsequent developments within the government, and we are giving them appropriate

guidance under cover. The main points of the same are as follows: (Yoshioka's mediation in this puts him in a "delicate" position in relation to the army attache' so this should be kept absolutely confidential within the department).

(1) Whenever there is discussion in the cabinet the points raised are, the real intentions of Japan, that is, the meaning of the East Asia Coprosperity plan, the involvements of the southward expansion policy, the extent of commodity supplying, and the duration of the time of stationing troops. Great Britain seizes upon these points and furnishes all kinds of contradictory material with which to keep the pro-British elements busy. To meet this WANITTO presents the absolute necessity of union between Japan and Thai and this has already become the firm conviction of the pro-Japanese group, and there thus is no need for further discussion as far as they are concerned. However the opposition have been bringing up troublesome arguments and hold tenaciously thereto. Since it was so difficult to convince them an appeal was made to us for material with which to counter them and their arguments.

(2) Since then the pro-Japanese group have been having better success in their attempts, and their position has become more favorable. As a result the opposition, since about the 25th has kept silent. However, the matter has not been concluded.

(Part 2 being translated)

From: Bangkok
To: Tokyo
29 November 1941
#872 (Part 2 of 2)

3. The question of joint military action between Thai and Japan has already been brought up by the pro-Japanese faction, but up to date, they have expressed a desire to pursue a course of strict neutrality. They had taken a fairly firm stand that the first one, regardless of whether this be Britain or Japan, who makes the first move shall be considered Thai's enemy. Therefore, for Japan to be looked upon as Thai's helper, she should put Britain in a position to be the first aggressor. For the purpose of accomplishing this, Japan should carefully avoid Thai territory, and instead, land troops in the neighborhood of KOTAPARU in British territory, which would almost certainly force Britain to invade Thailand from PATANBESSA. The consequence would be Thai's declaration of war on Britain.

This strategy is being given careful consideration. Apparently this plan has the approval of Chief of Staff BIJITTO. Our naval Attaché has advised the Naval General Staff, also, I think.

4. WANITTO and SIN are both considerably concerned of the weak character of PIBUN. As a means of making PIBUN make a decision, they think that it would be well to have some outside pressure brought to bear on him. As one means, they suggest that some undesirable Japanese be forcibly removed from Thai by Japan, and then to publicize this as the forerunner of a general evacuation of Japanese nationals from Thai.

From the above and from other considerations, including that of the tone of PIBUN's radio broadcast which was reported in my message #871****, the situation here may show some unexpectedly speedy and

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GB-149

D654

[Secret]

From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
December 8, 1941
(Priority)
#1437 Limited distribution

Re my #143(9?).[a]

At 1:00 p. m. today (8th) I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at general headquarters discussing how the formalities of declaring war could be carried out so as to make a good impression on the German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th Hitler issued orders to the entire German navy to attack American ships whenever and wherever they may meet them.

It goes without saying that this is only for your secret information.

Army 25978 Trans. 12/9/41

[a] Not available.

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